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ABSTRACT 
This paper posits a comparative analysis between two views of ludic meaning in 
game studies. The same two puzzles from Thekla, Inc.’s 2016 puzzle adventure game 
The Witness are interpreted first from a proceduralist perspective and then are re-
interpreted from a play-centric perspective derived from a combination of practice 
theory and game scholar Miguel Sicart’s formulation of play. The purpose of this 
analysis is to demonstrate how a game otherwise well-suited to proceduralist readings 
might be more completely understood from such a play-centric perspective and 
presents this experimental method of analysis by example. 
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Figure 1: The Witness (2016), The final two puzzles 
in the ‘tetromino’ marsh area. 
Can the above two logic puzzles from Thekla, Inc’s 2016 puzzle adventure game, The 
Witness, be said to “refer to one another?” Given the information that the solutions to 
these puzzles do not functionally rely on one another in any way, what metric, 
method, or semiotic logic should be consulted to determine if these puzzles are in 
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some way referencing each other? Two schools of thought in game studies might be 
productively consulted to answer this question. The “proceduralist” position of ludic 
meaning can be characterized as the view that meanings in games are derived from 
their rules, and that games are encoded with particular ideological perspectives by 
affording certain possibilities for play while restricting others (Treanor, et al., 2011). 
While scholars who advocate proceduralist positions vary in the degree to which they 
adopt its principles, a consequence of believing that a game’s meaning can be derived 
from its rules is the view that videogames afford players a representational mode 
through process.1 As Ian Bogost describes in his book that formulates the 
proceduralist view, Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames, 
“Procedural representation is significantly different from textual, visual, and plastic 
representation... only procedural systems like computer software actually represent 
process with process.” (Bogost, 2010). Adopting this view would encourage us to 
look to each of these puzzles’ rules, underlying logic, and various possible solutions 
to determine how they are similar, and whether we can consider one of their 
processes a reference to the other. 
However, the proceduralist focus on game rules as a site for interpretation has been 
critiqued by Miguel Sicart, who argues in his article “Against Procedurality” that 
proceduralist analysis does not adequately factor player experience. For Sicart, 
proceduralism renders personal experience of play, the socio-cultural context a game 
is played in, and an individual’s reasons for playing secondary to an abstracted 
conception of play that an analyst infers from game rules. Moreover, Sicart posits a 
view that ludic meaning is only ever brought to bear in particular acts of play, and 
does not exist in game systems without players: 
Games structure play, facilitate it by means of rules. 
This is not to say that rules determine play: they 
focus it, they frame it, but they are still subject to the 
very act of play. Play, again, is an act of 
appropriation of the game by players.  
This understanding of play contradicts the designer-
dominant perspective of the proceduralists, all too 
focused on rules and systems and their meaning. 
Play, for being productive, should be a free, flexible, 
and negotiated activity, framed by rules but not 
determined by them. (Sicart, 2011) 
By this view, an analysis of the puzzles in Figure 1 would be incomplete without 
taking into account a particular play experience. Sicart suggests that the proceduralist 
view fetishizes game rules by ascribing them with meaning-productive power they do 
not have without players. His position of ludic meaning has been referred to as “play-
centrism,” a shorthand I’ll borrow here (Treanor & Mateas, 2014). 
That being said, Sicart’s view of proceduralism has been somewhat infamously 
accused of being a strawman argument.2 A more moderate, “proper proceduralist,” 
stance that intends to account for the player’s role in producing ludic meaning has 
been put forward by self-identified proceduralists Mike Treanor and Michael Mateas: 
“Without interpreters, a process inside a digital computer can amount to no more than 
abstract causal flows of electrons. Likewise, the mechanisms of physical games, like 
football or board games, are not meaningful until a player puts them into operation by 
ascribing them meaning. Game rules must be first interpreted by players and then 
understood as the vehicles of metaphors about some domain” (Treanor & Mateas, 
2014). The proceduralist focus on metaphor interests me a great deal when 
considering ways to understand The Witness.3 It’s lead designer, Jonathan Blow, has 
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shared his understanding of the game’s puzzles as depicting a “puzzle language” that 
conveys underlying, structural ideas integral to the puzzle solutions themselves: 
...there’s a system of puzzles, and a sort of a puzzle 
language that you learn—or that you get the sense 
of—that’s all communicated nonverbally… the 
puzzles illustrate concepts to you as you solve 
them… every puzzle has a point, and you understand 
the point because in the process of solving the puzzle 
you had to see this new idea, and then by the time 
you’ve played all the way through the game you’ve 
played 20-plus hours of this stream of puzzle ideas… 
(Rev3Games) 
In Sicart’s critique, he characterizes Blow’s position as proceduralist, by referring to 
similar comments Blow made about his prior game Braid. Sicart summarizes Blow’s 
stance as, “Rules and meaning are created, and contained by, the puzzles—what 
players do is complete the meaning of the rules, derive meaning from a system, rather 
than focus on the creativity of play, since it is not the activity what [sic.] is important, 
but the system” (Sicart, 2011). In a few important ways, though, Blow’s perspective 
might even be considered a more radical proceduralism than the metaphorical 
readings Treanor, Mateas, and Bogost have advocated for. His perspective is still as 
rule-based and object-oriented as any formal proceduralist reading, but for Blow his 
puzzles don’t point outward toward a metaphorical concept, but inward toward their 
own internal logics—presenting them as conceptual sculptures for their own sake and 
containing truly systemically embedded meanings. 
It would be unproductive and gauche to make assumptions about what individuals 
actually think about where meaning ‘resides’ in videogames, and such speculation is 
beside the point. The point of looking at Blow’s position is more to observe that The 
Witness is a game that is well-suited to accept this rule-based, ‘hard’ proceduralist 
reading (to borrow phrasing from Treanor and Mateas) since one of its own creators 
already posits a compelling view from this perspective (Treanor & Mateas, 2014). 
But even if this is the case, I wonder if the opposition between so called “play-
centrism” and “proceduralism” is such that a game like The Witness can’t still 
productively accept a play-centric analysis. In the interest of developing and putting 
into practice some of what Sicart advocates, my goal here is to play with these 
methods to produce a robust reading of a complicated art game. 
Though The Witness may at first seem an odd site for play-centric analysis, 
particularly because of it’s apparent suitedness for procedural readings, I argue that a 
play-centric approach is necessary to fully understand the relationship between these 
two tetromino puzzles. To make this case, I perform and compare two analyses of 
these puzzles. The first is a ‘hard’ proceduralist reading informed by Blow’s 
perspective of the “puzzle language,” which examines the rules these puzzles derive 
from, along with the context in which they appear. I explain how such a proceduralist 
approach might say that the puzzle panel on the right refers to the one on the left, and 
subsequently that they each represent a simplification, or microcosm, of the broader 
possibility space of rules the tetromino puzzles are derived from. I then posit a 
modified play-centrist reading that aims to deepen these conclusions by considering 
the puzzles as more than a series of recognized ideas. Rather, the act of solving them 
invokes a habituated history of training players to internalize and recognize puzzle 
patterns. I buttress my analysis with Sicart’s view of play outlined in his book, Play 
Matters, along with a practice theory perspective adopted from religion scholar 
Catherine Bell. 
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My goal for this analysis is to further one of Sicart’s closing statements in “Against 
Procedurality”: “my position against procedurality is that of a demand: for each 
procedural analysis there must be an orthogonal analysis of play that completes the 
arguments of meaning by means of accounting the play experience” (Sicart, 2011). I 
believe The Witness presents a hard case for Sicart’s critiques of proceduralism, and I 
pose these readings as something of an experiment: If the premises of Sicart’s 
critiques are adopted, namely that ludic meaning comes from player experience and 
not the game system itself, how might game analysts make sense of games seemingly 
ideal for even the strictest proceduralist methods like The Witness? I conclude that 
applying Sicart’s view of play to The Witness affords an interpretive vantage point 
beyond the scope of procedurality alone. Though a proceduralist perspective affords 
rich analysis of The Witness, there is a played domain to the meaning of these puzzles 
that is inaccessible by focusing strictly on formal game elements. This domain is 
better characterized by Sicart’s views that play’s meanings, even within rigid 
systems, are ultimately personal to individual players, negotiated in a player’s 
resistance to or compliance with the game system, and creative in that what is played 
is itself enacted and produced. 
CONTEXTUALIZING THE PUZZLES 
Before moving forward with my interpretations of these puzzles, their in-game 
context and solutions require explanation. Each of The Witness’ 500+ panel puzzles 
offer a self-contained logic the player must deduce. Players wander an abandoned, 
open-world island, throughout which they encounter computer tablet-like touch 
screens. Panel screens presents the player with a maze puzzle. Players draw lines 
from a circular starting-point of the maze puzzle to a rounded-off ending-point, 
usually located in a corner of the maze’s grid. The first puzzles simply ask the player 
to draw a line through the maze (Fig. 2), while future puzzles incorporate obscure 
symbols on the grid (Fig 3). Through trial and error, players discover that each 
symbol corresponds to a rule that dictates how players must draw their paths in 
prescribed patterns through the maze. 
 
Figure 2: One of the first puzzles in The Witness, no 
symbols. 
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Figure 3: Two of the earliest puzzles that introduce 
symbols. The white stones must be divided from the 
dark stones to solve these puzzles. 
 
Figure 4: The star symbol puzzles require players to 
group stars in pairs of two. 
The island is divided into different biomes, each of which house a puzzle category. 
For instance, the star symbol puzzles (Fig. 4) require players to draw lines around 
symbols in groups of two and are mostly located in a tree-top area accessible through 
a network of bridges. Similarly, the puzzles with the multicolored squares (Fig. 5) ask 
players to draw lines around groups of like-colored squares. These color puzzles can 
be found in a greenhouse bunker area (Fig. 6), where a room’s lighting heavily 
influences how the colors of symbols are perceived. 
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Figure 5: The color puzzles require players to group 
like-colors and divide away unlike colors. 
 
Figure 6: The bunker area houses a series of color-
based puzzles. 
If players do not draw a path that corresponds with a symbol’s requirements, the line 
they have drawn may flash red, and a sound effect reminiscent of a screen powering 
down will indicate the solution attempt failed. If a puzzle is successfully solved, the 
path the player drew will remain on the panel screen, accompanied by a digital chirp 
suggesting an electrical circuit has been completed. Solved puzzles in most cases 
send power through wires that connect each set of panels, powering up new touch 
screens with new puzzles for the player to progress through. 
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Figure 7: The marsh biome which houses the 
tetromino puzzle series. 
The puzzles this analysis focuses on (Fig. 1) are located at the end of the marsh biome 
(Fig. 7). These puzzles require players to draw a path that corresponds with the 
tetromino shape on the grid. These block-like symbols are additive such that the 
shapes they depict can be ‘stacked’ on one another within the path the player draws. 
In Figure 8, the two three-block tetrominoes can be combined with the four-block 
tetromino to form the following path shapes: 
 
Figure 8: The horizontal tetromino is drawn at the 
bottom of each puzzle path, while the two vertical 
tetrominoes are ‘stacked’ on top. 
The puzzle will accept these shapes in any orientation so long as the line encapsulates 
all necessary tetromino symbols. See if you can identify where each tetromino shape 
is drawn within these pathways. For the panel on the left, look only at the left-half of 
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the grid demarcated by the yellow line, and for the panel on the right, look only at the 
bottom-half of the grid demarcated by the yellow line. 
Half way through the marsh area, the player is introduced to blue tetromino symbols 
(Fig. 9). Unlike the yellow tetrominoes, these blue symbols are subtractive. If the 
player groups a blue symbol with a yellow symbol, the number of cells a yellow 
shape requires to be drawn is deducted by the number of cells the blue shape depicts. 
 
Figure 9: The total cells indicated by a yellow 
symbol are deducted by the cells indicated by a blue 
symbol. 
After completing roughly 50 of these puzzles, the player reaches the end of the marsh 
area. Solving all the mandatory puzzles in a biome completes an electrical circuit 
connecting all solved puzzles to a laser beam. The beam jets out from the biome that 
housed a puzzle group to the top of the island’s highest peak (Fig. 10). Activating a 
majority of these lasers opens the final section of the game located at the top of the 
mountain. 
 
 -- 9  -- 
 
Figure 10: The marsh biome laser. 
It is here, by this laser, where the puzzles depicted in Figure 1 can be found after 
successfully completing the tetromino area. These two puzzles are located on a 
locked door, which can only open the way out of this area after both puzzles are 
solved. When the player first encounters these puzzles, the blue panel on the right is 
turned off, and must be activated by first solving the puzzle on its left. Once both 
panels are solved, the door opens to a shortcut the player can use later to access the 
marsh more quickly. With this context on the game provided, I turn now to my 
proceduralist analysis of these two puzzles. 
THE PROCEDURALIST PERSPECTIVE 
Jonathan Blow advocates for a way of interpreting The Witness’s puzzles as instances 
of a “puzzle language,” a view he develops in depth during a 2011 IndieCade lecture 
alongside friend and fellow designer Marc ten Bosch (Indie Cade, 2011). In this 
lecture, Blow analyzes a sequence where players are introduced to a new puzzle type. 
The underlying rule for these puzzles requires white-colored symbols to be divided 
from dark-colored symbols and is the first time players encounter any symbols on 
puzzle grids at all. In a previous article, I’ve argued that this sequence of puzzles is 
emblematic of an aesthetic design strategy Blow makes recurring use of that I call an 
“understanding check” (Wright, 2017). The understanding check is more than merely 
training players to master mechanics, as it habituates the player to expressly notice 
certain types of patterns, then breaks those patterns to demand players recognize an 
element of puzzle logic that the previous puzzles have only ever implied. 
 
 -- 10  -- 
 
Figure 11: The first understanding check in The 
Witness. Players are conditioned by prior puzzles to 
draw lines around the white squares, however the 
puzzle on the right requires players to draw a path 
that primarily follows the pattern of the dark squares. 
When describing how this early string of puzzles in Figure 11 makes, then breaks, 
patterns, Blow had this to say: 
...another way to make puzzles extra interesting is to 
build a hierarchy of ideas out of them… if you can 
make a sequence and there’s a pattern along the 
sequence, the player can have a gradually dawning 
surprise, or sort of a sublime growing of 
understanding of what this sequence is about... It’s 
different from training the mechanic, and that’s 
interesting…allowing myself to talk in the puzzles 
about things that are not directly related to training 
the mechanic helps me build a superstructure that’s 
very interesting around those puzzles. (Indie Cade, 
2011) 
This “superstructure” Blow refers to suggests that accumulated puzzle solving 
develops, and transforms, the meaning of individual puzzles. While one way to 
interpret the puzzle couplet in Figure 1 (and reproduced in Figure 12, below) would 
be to take each panel in isolation, Blow’s account suggests a reading that encourages 
seeing puzzles in sequence cumulatively. This cumulative understanding of puzzle 
groups suggests that individual puzzles, such as the tetromino couplet, might be 
thought of as standing-in for a superstructure of ideas that they, themselves, are a part 
of constituting. 
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Figure 12: The puzzle couplet, alternate solution. 
Consider, for instance, the context these puzzles share at the end of a biome devoted 
to their puzzle type. After completing a difficult gauntlet of roughly 50 prior 
tetromino puzzles, the player is presented with an unusually simple puzzle on the left 
(as the right panel is deactivated until the left puzzle is solved) (Fig. 11). After 
solving the first, the second essentially asks the player to perform the mirror image of 
the same logical steps. Where the first asks players to think in positive terms (draw an 
‘L’ block), and the second asks players to think in negative terms (start with a full 
grid, take one ‘L’ block away). Thinking of this tetromino couplet like the puzzle 
string in Blow’s example (as the culmination of a larger grouping of related puzzles), 
their relative simplicity and ease stand out from the other marsh puzzles. What 
meaning or effect can be read into presenting the player with two simple puzzles after 
so many more difficult puzzles have been previously solved? 
Following this thread, a Blow-inspired, ‘hard’ proceduralist stance might argue that 
the tetromino couplet present a kind of synecdoche, where a particular puzzle can 
stand-in for the broader design “space of possibility” the puzzle derives from (Salen 
& Zimmerman, 2003).4 They are a microcosm that captures and articulates the 
broader spatial-reasoning superstructure the tetromino puzzles instill in the player. 
This reading can be inferred from each puzzles’ solutions and their relative placement 
to past puzzles. In fact, the relative simplicity of the couplet’s solutions, particularly 
their placement at the end of a host of difficult spatial-reasoning puzzles, leads me to 
believe that the sudden decrease in complexity is a defamiliarization technique.5 Like 
the black and white puzzle Blow references, the purpose of these puzzles goes beyond 
training the mechanic, as the mechanic by now should be mastered. Rather, the two 
express a simplified instance of a broader puzzle schema. Where the yellow puzzle’s 
solution is a simple example of tetrominomic spatial reasoning, the blue puzzle 
should then be understood from this perspective as a reflection of the first. It “refers” 
to the yellow puzzle in that it captures, then inverts, its logic. What this puzzle 
couplet communicates, then, is that the blue puzzles are the negative space to the 
yellow puzzle’s positive space. 
Given this perspective that these puzzles do engage in some manner of 
representational relationship, the specific nature of their representational relationship 
can be more-concretely formulated. Game scholar Paweł Grabarczyk provides a 
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typology of representations in video games, which affords precise language for such 
interpretive work. Grabarczyk’s matrix of representations in videogames posits a 
Piercian trichotomy composed of indices, symbols, and icons. These representation 
channels are paired with referents that exist either internally or externally to the game 
and are either a part of the game’s fictional world (diegetic) or are excluded from the 
fiction (non-diegetic). Grabarczyk summarizes the distinction between symbols, 
icons, and indices as follows: 
...a given object A can be said to be [an icon of] a 
given object B if there exists a nontrivial 
homomorphism between A and B... As for symbolic 
representations… their most important 
characterization is that they are based on a 
convention – that is, that contrary to the two other 
types, the relation which bounds them to their targets 
isn’t a natural one… for a given object A to be an 
indexical representation of B is for it to be caused by 
B. (Grabarczyk, 2016) 
In Grabarczyk’s model, the tetromino couplet straddles two distinct categories 
depending on how they are considered. The representational channel the blue puzzle 
uses to refer to the yellow might be classified as a symbolic internal-non-diegetic 
representation. This is because the two puzzles are not directly related in any formal 
sense, but by convention only: their placement together, similarity in shape, and 
overlap in spatial logic needed to solve them. An analyst might infer that there is a 
metaphorical relationship between the two, and thereby that the second refers to the 
first through proxy. However, as proposed by Blow, a hard proceduralist analysis 
might also consider the puzzles to have another kind of referential relationship to the 
broader superstructure they represent. 
I mentioned above that we might think of each puzzle as representationally linked to 
this superstructure of ideas via synecdoche, where each individual panel stands-in as 
a partial instance of the whole set of ideas. We could think of each puzzle 
individually as a point on a map that charts out the game’s space of possibility, and, 
in fact, the work of a designer making these puzzles would be to explore this 
possibility space by literally deriving puzzles from it—as Blow describes is his design 
process in the IndieCade lecture (IndieCade, 2011). I’d argue that, in line with 
Grabarczyk’s model, the puzzles could be classified as indexical internal-non-
diegetic representations, which is jargon in need of unpacking. The view I’m adopting 
to interpret these puzzles suggests that they do not point outside of the game toward 
some broader metaphorical concept, but rather point internally toward their own 
systemic logic, and so they represent an aspect of the game’s general internal 
processes with their own particular processes. I’d further argue that their relationship 
to this broader superstructure of ideas is actually causal, that like smoke is to fire (the 
classic example of indexical signification), these particular puzzles are to be thought 
of as literal consequences of a space of possibility they are derived from, and so are 
indeixical signs.6 
This procedural analysis seems adequately supported by the game’s rules, 
affordances, and the orientation of puzzles. My understanding of puzzles in The 
Witness, however, is that they are actually more than a network of superstructurally 
linked ideas, and so I cannot whole-heartedly adopt this reading myself. In my view, 
The Witness’ puzzles are a means of attuning personal change in the player by 
habituating her to recognize select patterns. I, therefore, consider an important 
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element of The Witness lacking from this proceduralist interpretation, and move to a 
play-centric reading to posit what I see as a more complete analysis. 
THE PLAY-CENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 
In the spirit of Sicart’s call to couple proceduralist interpretations with a 
corresponding account that privileges play, this section is not intended to counter or 
challenge the prior proceduralist reading. Rather, it’s aim is to extend the proposed 
reading of the tetromino couplet into player experience—to make the proceduralist 
stance account for what it excludes. This approach has all of the advantages and 
drawbacks of taking a diverse and varied perspective like play-centrism and asking it 
to work within what Lars de Wildt cleverly calls a “procedural architecture,” or the 
grounding of a player’s personal, negotiated play within formal constraints (Wildt, 
n.d.). 
Sicart’s formulation of play in Play Matters notably accommodates this narrowed 
view: “Sometimes the beauty of play resides in the tension between control and 
chaos. Sometimes playing is voluntarily surrendering to form; sometimes it's being 
seduced into form, being appropriated by a plaything” (Sicart, 2014). What Sicart 
calls the “form,” or structure, of a game can subdue players into playing by rules as 
opposed to his preferred appropriation of rules. Though Sicart maintains that 
conforming play to rules weakens it’s more appropriative and subversive traits, play 
remains deeply personal, creative, and meaning-productive even within more rigid 
game structures: 
Play is appropriation, and therefore its relations with 
form are complicated. Form encapsulates, shapes, 
and steers play to a certain extent, but it is also 
seduced by play and appropriated by it… Game 
systems can only partially contain meaning, because 
meaning is created through an activity that is 
contextual, appropriative, creative, disruptive, and 
deeply personal. Games are props for that activity; 
they are important because they focus on it, not 
because they contain or trigger its meaning. (Sicart, 
2014) 
Veering off somewhat from Sicart’s ideological bend, but still working within the 
bounds of his theory, I’d argue that the player solving the tetromino couplet does not 
wholly surrender meaning to the game system, but maintains a personal, negotiated 
freedom within constraint. From the above, he acknowledges that play can manifest 
as adherence to the game’s form, but then stresses later that designing for play means 
“creating a setting rather than a system, a stage rather than a world, a model rather 
than a puzzle” (Sicart, 2014). Sicart makes no bones about bleeding together his 
philosophy of how play works into his aesthetic design preferences, but his focus on 
play’s appropriative subversion of game rules leaves something of a gap in his 
formulation of play. 
For this reason, I transition from relying on Sicart’s theories to appropriating them 
somewhat for my own purposes. I extend the personal nature of play into experiences 
where the player voluntarily operates within constraint. Solving puzzles in The 
Witness is not derived from the player dogmatically following what she is told to do 
by an authoritative system, but rather her tinkering emerges out of curiosity whereby 
the player comes to see what the designer sees in each puzzle. To be seduced by the 
form of The Witness, to revel in its prescriptive boundaries, is not a command—“look 
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and see!”—but is rather a guided seeing, or recognition motivated by volitional 
curiosity—“I see what you see.”  
Moving outside of game studies for a way to develop Sicart’s theory, religion scholar 
Catherine Bell’s research on ritual from the perspective of practice theory comes to 
mind, as formulated in Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice. One of the points of contention 
within ritual studies during her time of writing seems surprisingly like the 
proceduralism debate: the degree to which rituals can be interpreted as primarily 
communicative formal structures. Citing Roy Rappaport, Bell provides an elegant 
summary of how the self-effacing nature of practice is such that the meaning of ritual 
is often reduced to communication, even though it might be best understood as the 
habituated strategies which produce ritualized bodies: 
Rappaport makes a similar point in describing how 
the act of kneeling does not so much communicate a 
message about subordination as it generates a body 
identified with subordination. In other words, the 
molding of the body within a highly structured 
environment does not simply express inner states. 
Rather, it primarily acts to restructure bodies in the 
very doing of the acts themselves. Hence, required 
kneeling does not merely communicate 
subordination to the kneeler. For all intents and 
purposes, kneeling produces a subordinated kneeler 
in and through the act itself… Indeed, ritualization is 
the strategic manipulation of ‘context’ in the very act 
of reproducing it. (Bell, 1992) 
There is an appealing similarity between Sicart’s play-centrist focus on the player’s 
“negotiation” within a rigid play structure and Bell’s account of how the kneeler’s 
bodily comportment produces the kneeling ritual itself. Though the activities, game 
and ritual, occupy meaningfully different cultural contexts that prevents much 
comparison between each type of act, there is a useful analogousness to the framing 
of power in both situations. Where the play-centrist argues that all significance in a 
game is brought to bear by the productive play of the player, the practice theorist 
suggests that the ritual’s significance (even existence) is only ever brought to bear by 
and through a ritualized body. 
Deviating sharply from Sicart, this embodiment is necessarily personal for the ritual 
practitioner in Bell’s view; regardless of how strictly the adherent can be said to 
follow or appropriate the rite: 
Integral to the process of objectification and 
embodiment described earlier are concomitant 
processes of consent, resistance, and negotiated 
appropriation. In a very basic way, one consents to 
participation by a variety of internal discriminations 
about one’s relation to what is going on…a 
participant, as a ritualized agent and social body, 
naturally brings to such activities a self-constituting 
history that is a patch-work of compliance, 
resistance, misunderstanding, and a redemptive 
personal appropriation of the hegemonic order… Just 
as participation is negotiated, so are the processes of 
objectification and embodiment. Embodiment, like 
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consensual participation in the objectification 
process of the rite, is experienced as a negotiated 
appropriation, not as a total and indiscriminate 
absorption or social molding. (Bell, 1992) 
The ritual practitioner actually produces what a social theorist might call the ‘ritual 
object,’ or the formal structure that seems to authoritatively govern the adherent’s 
practice. Bell’s point, however, is that it is a mistake to conclude that formal ritual 
objects can be formulated as distinct from particular ritualized acts and particular 
ritualized bodies. Doing so would divide dancer from dance via an abstracted, 
theoretical fetishization of this structure; a critique I think of as parallel to what Sicart 
might call the proceduralist’s fetishization of a game’s rules or “form.” As such, 
voluntary participation in what Bell calls “the objectification process,” or what may 
seem like the ‘subduction’ of a ritual practitioner into the formal structure of ritual is 
actually always an individual negotiating her adherence to a history of practice. 
Where the ritual practitioner partakes in producing a habituated history that 
constitutes and codifies the ritual object itself, the player of The Witness produces a 
played habituated history of embodied solving, and as such produces a certain, 
guided, way of seeing. 
 
Figure 13: The puzzle couplet, third alternate 
solution to blue puzzle. 
With the help of practice theory, a play-centric reading of the tetromino couplet 
comes into focus. Where the above proceduralist argument ends by designating each 
puzzle as representations of a broader superstructure of ideas, a play-centric 
account—focused on the embodied practice of the player—would de-emphasize the 
symbolism of these puzzles, and highlight the habituated history of play the player 
brings to bear on them when tinkering with possible solutions. Where the 
proceduralist view frames the player’s primary task as producing solutions that 
demonstrate knowledge of a puzzle's latent ideas, the play-centered analysis considers 
the player’s act of solving puzzles as entailing and reproducing a history of prior 
solving. Acts of failing to solve puzzles would enter here as well, as they in turn 
become a part of the played, habituated history players accrue as they internalize the 
game’s logics. Players of The Witness produce a playing and pattern seeing body that 
correlates with Bell’s kneeler’s kneeling body. In this sense, playing The Witness is 
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always already personal, and individuals negotiate their freedom, submission, and 
appropriation of/to the game’s possibilities through this history of habituated pattern-
recognition. 
To finally return to the original question, can a play-centric analysis then call the 
relationship between the puzzles of marsh area’s puzzle couplet “referential” or 
“representational?” It seems to me that a play-centric perspective does not 
accommodate notions like metaphor so much as it can accommodates discussing 
repeated, habituated, acts of play. As such, my view is that the blue puzzle is a 
reinterpretation of the same core pattern-seeking training that the yellow puzzle 
facilitates. As such, it affords the player an opportunity to reproduce what they know, 
and what they have internalized, and does not merely represent those ideas. The 
puzzles are not reducible to their solutions, nor to any particular interpretation of their 
metaphorical or synecdochical meaning; they are also their solving. In other words, 
while producing solutions for the yellow puzzle invokes a history of additive 
tetromino patterns, producing solutions for the blue tetromino puzzle invokes a 
combined history of recognizing the additive patterns and the subtractive patterns. 
This is because the subtractive patterns are always reliant on the pre-recognition of 
the yellow tetromino additive logic, as the yellow blocks are always needed so the 
blue blocks have something to take away. Because the blue puzzle emulates and 
reproduces the training offered by the yellow puzzle, this is less a representation of 
the yellow puzzle in any way that Grabarczyk’s model could articulate, and more an 
invocation of the yellow puzzle. 
CONCLUSION 
Though The Witness is necessarily a game that accepts effective and productive 
proceduralist analysis, my play-centric account seeks to demonstrate that—even for 
games that readily accept this type of reading—an important part of meaning in game 
rules risks being overlooked by the very perspective that emphasizes them. A method 
that focuses primarily on a videogame’s formal structure and rules as its site of 
meaning risks missing out on the player’s personal process of attunement to those 
rules—the process of embodying rules and transforming mechanics into habits. My 
goal with this exercise has been to demonstrate how a play-centric analysis 
accommodates and enriches the interpretation of games analysts might otherwise 
primarily think of in proceduralist terms. I’ve proposed introducing a particular usage 
of practice theory to discuss how rigid game systems and mechanics can be thought 
of more in terms of bodily habituation than a more object-oriented formulation. From 
a design perspective, particularly one of design aesthetics, such a formulation might 
encourage thinking about mechanics less as systems and more as habits. These habits 
designers instill in the player through her practice and play of the game, which can 
afford her new ways of seeing the world. 
While the proceduralist position affords a reading of these two puzzles as 
representational, my proposed combination of play-centrism with practice theory 
shifts the focus onto how players are transformed by operating within The Witness 
strict structure. In the act of solving one puzzle, the other is reenacted and 
reinterpreted. Where the proceduralist view helps to formulate a system-centric rule 
of synecdoche—where one puzzle stands in for a broader set—the play-centric 
perspective opens the door to the way games can pattern player behavior for aesthetic 
effect. This invocation of past, practiced, embodied play activities is curated in these 
two puzzles, and is closer to refrain in music scoring than mere reference. The 
puzzles are more than what their systems convey, for they are also a site that 
aestheticizes and curates the player’s sight. 
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Players bring to bear these puzzle solutions in their solving. It is more than 
understanding; It is embodied production and embodied reproduction of player 
attunement to seeing particular patterns. I conclude that solving this puzzle pair is not 
merely the recognition of two ideas players understand, though proceduralist readings 
of them as such do provide a rich analysis. To whatever extent each puzzle does 
represent or capture a deeper idea, they also afford a field for habituating players to 
look and see. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 For a sampling of diverse views among self-proclaimed “proceduralist” thinkers, 
consider the comments section of Charles J. Pratt’s blog post, “Players Not Included” 
(Pratt, 2012). 
2 Particularly, Mark Nelson and Jason Hawreliak’s responses come to mind, both of 
which critique Sicart’s characterization of proceduralist views (Nelson, 2012) 
(Hawreliak, 2012) 
3 For examples of proceduralist readings that emphasize metaphorical interpretations 
of game systems, mechanics, affordances, etc., consider examples such as Brenda 
Romero’s postmortem on her serious boardgame Train, or Mike Treanor and Michael 
Mateas’ proceduralist investigation of the arcade game Burgertime (Brathwaite & 
Sharp, 2010) (Treanor & Mateas, 2011). 
4 Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman’s oft-quoted definition of games from Rules of 
Play is referenced here. The “space of possibility” shorthand that many game 
scholars will be familiar with captures what I believe to be The Witness’ intended 
referent: the puzzles are particular instances of (and are therby are indexical symbols 
that represent) the possibility space they are cut and derived from. This is the thesis 
at the heart of my proceduralist reading. 
5 As Russian formalist Viktor Shklovsky describes this strategy, “The technique of art 
is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and 
length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself 
and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object: the 
object is not important…” [emph. original] (Shklovsky, 2004). 
6 In his PhD dissertation, games researcher Sebastian Möring interrogates the 
reliance on metaphor in proceduralist readings, where he dedicates a section to 
arguing that simulations (in a similar Piercian sense) relate to what they simulate via 
iconic synecdoche (Möring, 2013). For the manner of proceduralist reading he 
interrogates, which might be considered textual, metaphorical analyses of rules in the 
style popularized by Bogost, the representational connection between rules and their 
procedural meanings are iconic in nature. This is because a game’s rules stand-in for 
metaphorical readings beyond the rules themselves, and such a classification could 
also extend to my above reading of these puzzle’s synecdoche. However, I think what 
Blow advocates is notably different than the kind of procedural readings that concern 
Möring. Though like most in the proceduralist camp, Blow’s reading derives from his 
game’s solutions, rules, intended play styles and formal structures, each puzzle’s 
meaning points inward towards its own self-justifying, purposive structure and 
solution. If, for the sake of argument, we accept the reading that these puzzles refer 
collectively to a superstructure of rules each particular puzzle derives from, we might 
more precisely say that these puzzles’ symbolic relationship to this superstructure is 
indexical. This is because they are composed and caused by the pre-existence of this 
superstructure in a kind of mathematical sense—to design them is to explore this 
possibility space. This stance, that a game’s rules and formal structures are its locus 
of meaning in the purest sense, is what I’m putting forward as a Blow-inspired ‘hard’ 
proceduralist reading of The Witness. 
